The Right Man for the Job

This paper describes a search model with a continuum of workerand job types, transferable utility and an increasing returns to scale contact technology. We apply a second order Taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium. One third of theincreasing returns in contacts are absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy. Hence, strongly increasing returns in contact rates are consistent with weakly increasing returns in matching. The resulting equilibrium is not efficient. Unemployment benefitscan reduce the loss by serving as a search subsidy. The loss caused by search frictions is higher when worker types are bad substitutes. Numerical simulations of the model show our Taylor expansions to be quite accurate.assignment, search, unemployment

Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion is inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.efficiency, network clearing, random bipartite network formation, simultaneous search

Sorting and the Output Loss due to Search Frictions

We analyze a general search model with on-the-job search and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. This model yields a simple relationship between (i) the unemployment rate, (ii) the value of non-market time, and (iii) the max-mean wage differential. The latter measure of wage dispersion is more robust than measures based on the reservation wage, due to the long left tail of the wage distribution. We estimate this wage differential using data on match quality and allow for measurement error. The estimated wage dispersion and mismatch for the US is consistent with an unemployment rate of 4-6%. We find that without search frictions, output would be between 7.5% and 18.5% higher, depending on whether or not firms can ex ante commit to wage payments.on-the-job search, wage dispersion, mismatch, output loss due to frictions

A Flexible Test for Present Bias and Time Preferences Using Land-Lease Contracts

When agents have present bias, they discount more between now and the next period than between period t (> 1) and t + 1. How fast the future discount rate (evaluated today) decays is an empirical question. We show that the discount function can be non-parametrically identified with contracts that specify payments that take place at various points in time in the future and which are traded and priced in a competitive market. We use a unique land lease-contract data set for Amsterdam, which has the above properties, to test for present bias in a flexible way. We find no evidence for present bias in this market. Even though we allow for a general-hyperbolic specification (which has exponential discounting as a special case), our estimates converge to an exponential discount function with a corresponding discount rate (in our baseline specification) of 8 %.present bias, hyperbolic discounting, discount rate, hedonic estimation

A note on waiting

When students apply to universities or unemployed workers search in the labor market, anincrease of time input of one person (resulting in more applications) will increase the waitingtime of the others. In this paper it will be show that in a decentralized market there will beexcessive congestion Moreover, congestion increases with both the mean and the varianceof the net benefits associated with waiting across the population

The Right Man for the Job: Increasing Returns in Search?

This paper describes a search model with a continuum of worker and job types, transferable utility and an IRS contact technology. We apply a second order Taylor expansion to derive an analytical solution of the equilibrium. We find that one third of the increasing returns in contacts are absorbed by firms and workers being more choosy. Hence, strongly increasing returns in contact rates are consistent with weakly increasing returns in matching. In addition, we derive and decompose the efficiency loss due to inadequate incentives and show how unemployment benefits can reduce the loss. Finally, we derive a relation between the size of the surplus due to search frictions and the degree of substitutability of worker types at given job complexity levels. Numerical simulations of the model show that our approximations are quite accurate.

Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications

We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.wage setting, unemployment, minimum wage, Nash equilibrium

Marriage and the City

Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are therefore prepared to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, the marriage market benefits disappear while the housing premium remains. We extend the model of Burdett and Coles (1997) with a distinction between efficient (cities) and less efficient (non-cities) search markets. One implication of the model is that singles are more likely to move from rural areas to cities while married couples are more likely to make the reverse movement. A second prediction of the model is that attractive singles benefit most from a dense market (i.e. from being choosy). Those predictions are tested with a unique Danish dataset.marriage, search, mobility, city

Sin City?

Is moving to the countryside a credible commitment device for couples? We investigate whether lowering the arrival rate of potential alternative partners by moving to a less populated area lowers the dissolution risk for a sample of Danish couples. We find that of the couples who married in the city, the ones who stay in the city have significant higher divorce rates. Similarly, for the couples who married outside the city, the ones who move to the city are more likely to divorce. This correlation can be explained by both a causal and a sorting effect. We disentangle them by using the timing-of-events approach. In addition we use information on father’s location as an instrument. We find that the sorting effect dominates. Moving to the countryside is therefore not a cheap way to prolong relationships.dissolution; search; mobility; city

Car ownership and the Labor Market of Ethnic Minorities

We show how small initial wealth differences between low skilled black and white workers can generate large differences in their labor-market outcomes. This even occurs in the absence of a taste for discrimination against blacks or exogenous differences in the distance to jobs. Because of the initial wealth difference, blacks cannot afford cars while whites can. Car ownership allows whites to reach more jobs per unit of time and this gives them a better bargaining position. As a result, in equilibrium, blacks end up with both higher unemployment rates and lower wages than whites. Furthermore, it takes more time for blacks to reach their jobs even though they travel less miles. Those predictions are consistent with the data. Better access to capital markets or better public transportation will reduce the differences in labor market outcomes